Ciclo de recursos naturales y política fiscal bajo preferencias inconsistentes

Abstract

This study identifies two economic issues faced by natural-resource exporting economies: 1) a negative externality from a commodity boom, and 2) inconsistent preferences, which explain why governments prefer to spend the resources from the bonanza in lieu of saving them. These problems are analyzed for Colombia in the context of the oil cycle (2000-2018). First, vulnerabilities are tested. With a VAR-VEC methodology, the existence of a foreign exchange and spending effect (in investment and not in consumption) is demonstrated, while the presence of factorial effect and structural change is dismissed. When analyzing the saving mechanisms implemented for the bonanza, it is concluded that its inoperativeness is due to the permissiveness of investing in national government bonds; lack of vigilance and communication; low level of savings and absence (or lack of coordination) of a fiscal rule. Based on international comparisons and the new savings mechanisms in the royalties’ system, it is recommended to: 1) create a portfolio composed of external assets; 2) incorporate external, public and media surveillance; and 3) coordinate the fiscal rule with the fund.