Decentralization and bailouts in Colombia
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Enlace permanente: https://hdl.handle.net/11445/827
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Resumen
Descentralization has meny benefits, but it can also weaken fiscal discipline, specifically, expectations on the possibility of a bailout by central government create incentives for fiscal misbehavior, fiscal discipline does not pay because it carries a smaller expected bailout. In Colombia the substantial transfer form the central government to the sub-regions created structural expenditure pressures and irresponsible behavior in terms of debt (mainly ñoans from banks), brought the departments into default and forced the central government to bail them out.
Abstract
Descentralization has meny benefits, but it can also weaken fiscal discipline, specifically, expectations on the possibility of a bailout by central government create incentives for fiscal misbehavior, fiscal discipline does not pay because it carries a smaller expected bailout. In Colombia the substantial transfer form the central government to the sub-regions created structural expenditure pressures and irresponsible behavior in terms of debt (mainly ñoans from banks), brought the departments into default and forced the central government to bail them out.
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H72
H77
